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Introduction
Influenza is wrongly seen as a mild disease, but it can seriously
harm and kill, especially but not exclusively within vulnerable
segments of the population.1 One step hospitals are increasingly
taking to protect vulnerable patients is requiring their employees to
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1.

Martin G. Myers, The History of Vaccine Development and the Diseases
Vaccines Prevent, in VACCINOLOGY: AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE 1, 27-28 (Greg
N. Milligan & Alan D.T. Barrett eds., 2015).
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get an annual influenza vaccine.2 Opponents, unsurprisingly, attack
this policy as harmful to employees’ rights. This article examines the
legal issues surrounding that policy.
During June 2014, a New Jersey Court of Appeals ruled that a
hospital offering non-medical, religious exemptions from its policy of
mandating influenza vaccines cannot deny unemployment benefits to
a nurse whose opposition to the vaccine was based on secular
reasoning.3 While the case focused on unemployment benefits rather
than the mandate itself, the court’s reasoning in Valent v. Board of
Review, Department of Labor suggested that if a hospital offers any
non-medical exemptions from influenza vaccine mandates, it then
needs to extend exemptions to any employee with concerns, and
cannot limit exemptions to just those with religious objections.4
If other courts follow the Valent court’s reasoning, hospitals
wishing to impose immunization requirements may face a choice
between not offering religious exemptions or not being able to enforce
vaccination mandates. Even if other courts do not agree with Valent,
hospitals should seriously consider whether it is prudent to offer any
non-medical exemptions, since such exemptions are subject to abuse
and are not legally or constitutionally required.
The ruling in Valent presents an opportunity to consider the legal
issues surrounding mandatory vaccination of health care workers. We
agree with Stewart and Cox that state mandates are a better choice
than voluntary action by hospitals: they are more efficient, impose
uniform requirements across providers, and provide more certainty to
patients.5 But as Stewart and Cox highlight, only a significant
minority of states have adopted laws addressing this issue, and many
of those laws 6 lack strong enforcement mechanisms and may therefore
only loosely be considered vaccine mandates. Voluntary action taken
by hospitals may serve as an important intermediate measure until
states pass more effective legislation. Understanding the legal
framework for both the statutory and the employer-based options—
for example what can and cannot be done and where problems may
arise—can help hospitals or legislatures better think through this
issue.
2.

Henry H. Bernstein & Jeffrey R. Starks, Influenza Immunization for All
Health Care Personnel: Keep it Mandatory, 136 PEDIATRICS 809, 812
(2015).

3.

Valent v. Board of Review, Dept. of Labor, 91 A.3d 644 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2014).

4.

Id. at 647-48.

5.

Alexandra M. Stewart & Marisa A. Cox, State Law and Influenza
Vaccination of Health Care Personnel, 31 VACCINE 827, 830 (2013).

6.

Id. at 828.
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A.

Adoption of Influenza Vaccine Mandates

The last thing someone who is hospitalized needs is to contract
another illness during their stay. Some illnesses are harder to avoid
than others, but for others we have readily available vaccines. A
prime example is the vaccine against seasonal influenza. Twenty
states have statutes addressing influenza vaccination of health care
workers, and more may follow.7 In states without mandatory
vaccination laws, some hospitals voluntarily require employees to be
vaccinated out of the laudable desire to protect vulnerable patients
against a dangerous disease.8 Increasingly, hospitals around the
country have adopted policies requiring health care workers to be
vaccinated against influenza, with sanctions up to and including firing
imposed against recalcitrant employees.9
The influenza vaccine is not one of the most effective vaccines,10
although it is not as ineffective as anti-vaccine websites like to
pretend. This lack of effectiveness is not because scientists working on
it are less competent than scientists working on other vaccines, but
because it is objectively more difficult to produce.11 The influenza
virus mutates quickly, often rearranging its genes enough to trigger
yearly epidemics in different regions of the world at different times.12
Occasionally, the mutation will be severe enough that the whole of
humanity is not immune at the same time, triggering a pandemic like
the one recently seen in 2009.13 Additionally, the influenza virus grows
best—and slowly—in eggs rather than in tissue cultures like other
viruses, though more recently some vaccines have been produced
7.

Id.

8.

Some of these institutions can be found here: Wall of Shame, NURSES
AGAINST MANDATORY VACCINES, http://www.namv.org/healthcareorganizations-that-mandate-vaccines.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2015);
Influenza Vaccination Honor Roll, IMMUNIZATION ACTION COAL.,
http://www.immunize.org/honor-roll/influenza-mandates/honorees.asp
(last updated Feb. 11, 2016) (providing a list of institutions that
mandate vaccination).

9.

Jane M. Orient, Mandatory Influenza Vaccination for Medical Workers:
A Critique, 17 J. AM. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 111, 114 (2012).

10.

CDC,
Seasonal
Influenza
Vaccine
Effectiveness,
2005-2015,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/vaccination/effectivenessstudies.htm.

11.

CDC, Selecting the Viruses in the Seasonal Influenza (Flu) Vaccine
(2015), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/vaccination/virusqa.htm.

12.

WHO, Biologicals: Influenza, http://www.who.int/biologicals/vaccines/
influenza/en/.

13.

See F. Carrat & A. Flahault, Influenza Vaccine: The Challenge of
Antigenic Drift, 25 VACCINE 6852, 6854 (2007).
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using mammalian and insect cell lines.14 This results in a hefty
investment in eggs for growing the virus, and given the time needed
to grow the virus, it means that the strain that is to be grown must
be picked carefully six months ahead of the next flu season.15 This
process sometimes leads to a mismatch between the vaccine strain
and the strain that actually circulates during the annual flu
outbreak.16 In spite of all that, the vaccine, although not perfect, is
our best protection against influenza. In good years, its effectiveness
ranges from 60-70%17—a substantial reduction in the chances of
contracting the disease. In bad years, it can be much less. For
example, in the 2014-2015 influenza season, one of the strains
mutated after the creation of the vaccine, leading to substantially
reduced effectiveness—only 23% effective in completely preventing
influenza across all age groups (although effectiveness was higher in
children).18 Still, 23% effectiveness is still higher than the zero percent
non-vaccination provides. Even if the vaccine fails to prevent the
disease completely, it can reduce its severity.19 Also, it’s an extremely
safe vaccine.20
A recent meta-analysis of twelve observational studies found that
some research shows that health care workers, for the most part,
14.

Anthony E. Fiore et al., Inactivated Influenza Vaccines, in VACCINES
257, 266-68 (Stanley A. Plotkin et al. eds., 6th ed. 2013).

15.

See
CDC,
How
Influenza
(Flu)
Vaccines
are
Made,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/vaccine/how-fluvaccine-made.htm (last
updated Jan. 6, 2015).

16.

U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., The Evolution, and Revolution, of Flu
Vaccines
(Jan.
18,
2013),
http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/
consumerupdates/ucm336267.htm.

17.

CDC, Interim Estimates of 2013-14 Seasonal Influenza Vaccine
Effectiveness – United States. February 2014, 63 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY
WKLY.
REP.
137,
141
(Feb.
21,
2014),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6307a1.htm; CDC,
Estimated Influenza Illnesses and Hospitalizations Averted by Influenza
Vaccine – United States, 2012-13 Influenza Season, 62 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY
WKLY.
REP.
997,
999
(Dec.
13,
2013),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6249a2.htm.

18.

CDC, Protection from Flu Vaccination Reduced this Season (Jan. 15,
2014),
http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2015/p0115-fluvaccination.html.

19.

CDC, Influenza 151, 159, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/
downloads/flu.pdf; JM Kelso, Safety of Influenza Vaccines, 12 CURRENT
OPINION IN ALLERGY & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 383; CDC, Key Facts
About
Seasonal
Flu
Vaccine:
Benefits,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/keyfacts.htm#benefits.

20.

CDC, Seasonal Influenza Vaccine Safety: A Summary for Clinicians,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/vaccination/vaccine_safety.htm.
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agreed with mandates to get vaccinated as a condition of
employment.21 Almost all of the participants in one of the studies
(96.7%) were of the opinion that being immunized protected the
patients they served.22 Indeed, a 1994-1995 study found that
immunizing health care workers in a geriatric care facility reduced
mortality from influenza in the elderly patients more than vaccinating
the patients themselves.23 A randomized controlled trial in 2000 found
a similar effect.24 With regards to patient populations other than the
elderly, a 1997-2000 study of vaccine uptake and morbidity and
mortality in a hospital in Virginia showed that increased vaccine
uptake was associated with a lower number of nosocomial (hospital
acquired) cases and deaths from influenza.25
There is a strong ethical case for requiring vaccination of health
care workers against influenza. This is based on health care workers’
autonomous choice to work in a profession in which they care for
vulnerable individuals, they have responsibilities to patients and the
community, and the resulting high costs in lives and suffering if they
spread influenza because they did not receive the vaccine.26
However, while most health care workers understand and support
the requirement to vaccinate against influenza,27 a small minority
opposes it. Some oppose it because of the opposition to mandates.28
21.

See Samantha A. Pitts et al., A Systematic Review of Mandatory
Influenza Vaccination in Healthcare Personnel, 47 AM. J.
PREVENTATIVE MED. 330, 337 (2014).

22.

Id.

23.

J. Potter et al., Influenza Vaccination of Health Care Workers in LongTerm-Care Hospitals Reduces the Mortality of Elderly Patients, 175 J.
INFECTIOUS DISEASE 1, 1 (1997).

24.

W.F. Carman et al., Effects of Influenza Vaccination of Health-Care
Workers on Mortality of Elderly People in Long-Term Care: A
Randomised Controlled Trial, 355 THE LANCET 93, 93-97 (2000).

25.

Cassandra D. Salgado et al., Preventing Nosocomial Influenza by
Improving the Vaccine Acceptance Rate of Clinicians, 25 INFECTION
CONTROL & HOSP. EPIDEMIOLOGY 923, 923-27 (2004).

26.

See Arthur L. Caplan, Time to Mandate Influenza Vaccination in
Health-care Workers , 378 THE LANCET 310, 310-11 (2011); Abigale L.
Ottenberg et al., Vaccinating Health Care Workers Against Influenza:
The Ethical and Legal Rationale for a Mandate, 101 AM. J. PUBLIC
HEALTH 212, 212 (2011).

27.

Kristen A. Feemster et al., Employee Designation and Health Care
Worker Support of an Influenza Vaccine Mandate at a Large Pediatric
Tertiary Care Hospital, 29 VACCINE 1762, 1766 (2011).

28.

See Kinesh Patel, Resisting the Needle: Why I Won’t Have the Flu Jab,
BMJ
(Oct.
17,
2011),
http://www.bmj.com/content/343/
bmj.d6554?ijkey=92b2cf3e3f35e1d441a52de965e0bf1fe9bfd69d&keytype2
=tf_ipsecsha. But see Amy J. Behrman et al., Doctors Choosing Not to
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Others oppose it because of unfounded fears or anti-vaccine views.29
This viewpoint is especially troubling from a health care worker: if a
health care worker cannot trust something supported by evidence as
extensive as that supporting the safety of vaccines,30 how can they
trust the rest of the medical care they are ostensibly providing?
Furthermore, like the legal field, health care is a service profession.
Those who enter the field choose a job in which their role is to serve
and care for people who depend on and trust them. By making that
choice, a person is accepting certain limits on their conduct. If they
are unwilling to take the simple, safe precaution of an influenza
vaccine to protect the vulnerable patients under their care (a
protection that also protects them against a dangerous disease), a
health care worker is, arguably, failing that service duty.31
This Article explores the legal issues surrounding the influenza
vaccine requirement for health care workers. It highlights that the
requirement is in fact legitimate and legal, though collective
bargaining can limit what employers facing unionized work forces can
do unilaterally. We argue that while medical exemptions may be
required and are arguably desirable, there is no legal or constitutional
requirement to offer any other exemptions. It also highlights that if
an employer wants to provide a religious exemption, they are subject
to certain requirements that may make the exemption vulnerable to
abuse or allow it to swallow the mandate.
Part I sets the background by providing the data behind the
employers’ choice to require vaccinating against influenza. It
demonstrates that the vaccine is safe and can help protect patients
and save lives. Part II addresses the basic legality and
constitutionality behind requiring influenza vaccines, the litigation
surrounding it, as it has been until now, and what we know from
Be Vaccinated is Choosing to Do Harm, BMJ (Nov. 8, 2011),
http://www.bmj.com/content/343/bmj.d7198?tab=citation.
29.

See, e.g., Final Thoughts on the Bashista Case, NURSES AGAINST
MANDATORY
VACCINES
(Aug.
30,
2014),
http://nursesagainstmandatoryvaccines.wordpress.com/2014/08/30/final
-thoughts-on-the-bashista-case/.

30.

INST. MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF
STUDIES OF HEALTH OUTCOMES RELATED TO THE RECOMMENDED
CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATION SCHEDULE, THE CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATION
SCHEDULE AND SAFETY: STAKEHOLDER CONCERNS, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
FUTURE
STUDIES,
xiv
(Michael
Hayes
ed.,
2013),
AND
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13563&page=1.

31.

Kristen A. Feemster & Arthur L. Caplan, Should Flu Shots for Health
Professionals Be Required?, AM. MED. NEWS (Apr. 8, 2013),
http://www.amednews.com/article/20130408/profession/130409953/5/;
Behrman et al., supra note 27.
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other areas of the law. Part III examines the tricky question of
whether an employer is required to offer a religious exemption. It
highlights that a religious exemption is not required under our
Constitution;32 nor is it required under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.33
It also suggests that there is a strong argument that states with a
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) do not require even
public hospitals to offer a religious exemption. Part III also explains
the limits on and requirements of hospitals that choose to offer a
religious exemption from immunization requirements. Part IV lays out
our recommendations. We support state level statutory mandates,
and recommend including an enforcement mechanism. Absent such
mandates, we urge private employees to adopt their own mandate,
and provide medical exemptions, but not other exemptions.

I. Why Vaccinate Health Care Workers Against
Influenza?
In the United States, anywhere from 3,000 to 49,000 deaths are
attributed to influenza each year.34 Of those, the great majority are a
result of secondary bacterial infections or exacerbations of preexisting
medical conditions.35 The majority of those who die during any given
influenza season are very old, very young (e.g. neonates-newborns), or
very sick (e.g. cancer patients).36 One way to protect these
populations is by immunizing them against influenza, pneumococcus,
and H. influenzae—the latter two being common bacterial
complications of an influenza infection.37 However, this immunization
strategy has some limits. First, the people who comprise these groups
are made up mostly of persons whose immune system function is not
32.

Kevin M. Malone & Alan R. Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The
Public Health Imperative and Individual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC
HEALTH PRACTICE 262, 274 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2nd ed.
2007).

33.

See discussion infra Part III.B.2.

34.

Estimating Seasonal Influenza-Associated Deaths in the United States:
CDC
Study
Confirms
Variability
of
Flu,
CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/disease/us_flu-related_deaths.htm (last
updated Sept. 12, 2013).

35.

Id.

36.

CDC, Estimates of Deaths Associated with Seasonal Influenza --- United
States, 1976—2007, 59 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1057,
1057-62 (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/mm5933a1.htm.

37.

Michael B. Rothberg et al., Complications of Viral Influenza, 121 AM. J.
MED. 258, 260 (Apr. 4, 2008), http://download.thelancet.com/
flatcontentassets/H1N1-flu/pathogenesis/pathogenesis-8.pdf.
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normal. Neonates may not develop their own immune response to the
influenza vaccine until age six months.38 The elderly may not mount
an efficient immune response to the vaccine because of their advanced
age as well.39 People on chemotherapy may be immune deficient as a
side effect of their treatment.40
Even with the technical limitations of being unable to predict the
next strain of influenza with 100% certainty and having to grow most
of the vaccine viruses in eggs, the influenza vaccine is the best defense
against influenza available in vaccine form. It is not 100% effective,
nor near that, however.41 A meta-analysis of over 40 years of influenza
vaccine studies found that the vaccine’s effectiveness depended on the
age of the people getting it as well as the formulation (i.e. live,
attenuated intranasal vaccine versus killed injected vaccine).42
The influenza vaccine has a good track record of safety.43 In
children, the vaccine is not associated with serious side effects.44
During pregnancy, the influenza vaccine has been shown to prevent
serious outcomes from influenza infection in pregnant women while
38.

Paul A. Offit et al., Addressing Parents’ Concerns: Do Multiple
Vaccines Overwhelm or Weaken the Infant’s Immune System?. 109
PEDIATRICS 124, 125 (2002), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/
content/109/1/124.short.

39.

See E. Bernstein et al., Immune Response to Influenza Vaccination in a
Large Healthy Elderly Population, 17 VACCINE 82, 82 (1999).

40.

See, e.g., Leagh M. Boehmer et al., Influenza Vaccination in Patients
With Cancer: An Overview, CANCER NETWORK (Nov. 15, 2010),
http://www.cancernetwork.com/oncology-journal/influenza-vaccinationpatients-cancer-overview.

41.

See e.g., Vaccine Effectiveness - How Well Does the Flu Vaccine
Work?, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/qa/vaccineeffect.htm (last
updated Dec. 21, 2015); CDC, Estimated Influenza Illnesses and
Hospitalizations Averted by Influenza Vaccine – United States, 2012-13
Influenza Season, 62 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 993, 997
(Dec.
13,
2013),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6249a2.htm.

42.

See Michael T. Osterholm et al., THE COMPELLING NEED FOR GAMECHANGING
INFLUENZA
VACCINES
5-6
(2012),
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/sites/default/files/public/downloads/ccivi_
report.pdf.

43.

Influenza Vaccine Safety, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/
vaccine/vaccinesafety.htm (last updated Oct. 2, 2014).

44.

See, e.g., Jason M. Glanz et al., Safety of Trivalent Inactivated
Influenza Vaccine in Children Aged 24 to 59 Months in the Vaccine
Safety Datalink, ARCH. PEDIATRIC ADOLESC. MED. 749, 749-50 (2011);
Nicholas Wood et al., Influenza Vaccine Safety in Children Less Than 5
Years Old: The 2010 and 2011 Experience in Australia, 31 PEDIATRIC
INFECTIOUS DISEASE J. 199, 199-202 (2012).
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not being associated with serious side effects in the women or their
fetuses.45 Even persons with egg allergies, long believed to be ineligible
for receiving the influenza vaccine because the vaccine virus is grown
in eggs, can receive the vaccine safely.46 While not used in the United
States, vaccines with adjuvants (chemicals used to enhance the
immune response) have also been shown to be safe and very
effective.47
As stated previously, influenza vaccine effectiveness depends on
different factors. The live, attenuated vaccine has been shown to work
best in children while having decreased effectiveness in older adults.48
On the other hand, injectable vaccines have been shown to work best
in older adults.49 Currently, high-dose vaccines are recommended for
older adults because more antigens are needed in the vaccine to
trigger an immune response.50 Most health care workers will fall
somewhere between children and the elderly, making them prime
candidates for any vaccine formulation, albeit with the knowledge
that the vaccine will not be 100% effective in any population.
In order to prevent influenza transmission in the health care
setting, health care workers have different choices. They can wear
masks that are not guaranteed to prevent transmission and whose
proper use cannot be guaranteed.51 They can wash their hands with
45.

Glanz, supra note 44.

46.

John M. James et al., Safe Administration of Influenza Vaccine to
Patients with Egg Allergy, 133 J. PEDIATRICS 624, 624 (1998).

47.

Murdo Ferguson et al., Safety and Long-Term Humoral Immune
Response in Adults After Vaccination With an H1N1 2009 Pandemic
Influenza Vaccine With or Without AS03 Adjuvant, 205 J. INFECTIOUS
DISEASES
733
(2012),
http://jid.oxfordjournals.org/content/
205/5/733.short.

48.

Lisa A. Grohskopf et al., Prevention and Control of Seasonal Influenza
with Vaccines: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (Aug.
15,
2014),
at
691-692,
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6332a3.htm.

49.

See David Holland et al., Intradermal Influenza Vaccine Administered
Using a New Microinjection System Produces Superior Immunogenicity
in Elderly Adults: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 198 J. INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 650, 657 (Sep. 2008).

50.

Ann R. Falsey et al., Randomized, Double-Blind Controlled Phase 3
Trial Comparing the Immunogenicity of High-Dose and Standard-Dose
Influenza Vaccine in Adults 65 Years of Age and Older, 200 J.
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 172, 172 (2009).

51.

Mark Loeb et al., Surgical Mask vs N95 Respirator for Preventing
Influenza Among Health Care Workers A Randomized Trial, 302 JAMA
1865, 1870 (2009).
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every patient contact. However, guidelines about washing their hands
are often not followed by health care workers for a variety of
reasons.52 Influenza vaccination is a passive method for reducing cases
and deaths from influenza of patients and workers in health care
settings. That is, it doesn’t require anything more than being
immunized, and especially combined with proper hand washing and
use of personal protective equipment like masks, it can be part of a
comprehensive and highly effective influenza outbreak mitigation
strategy.

II: Mandating Vaccines
Vaccine mandates can stem from one of two sources, and different
legal frameworks apply to each. The first source is state statute or
state regulations. The second is employers’ workplace rules. The legal
situation is somewhat different between the two. This section starts
by describing the adoption of mandates first in the hospitals, where
the idea started, then by state legislatures. Then it separates out a
discussion of the legal issues, first for states and then for hospitals.
A. First Steps: Voluntary Mandates in Hospitals

The first hospitals to adopt mandatory immunizations policies
were Bronson Methodist Hospital in Kalamazoo, Michigan and
Virginia Mason Medical Center in Seattle, Washington, in 2005.53 By
2009, twenty-five other institutions did the same.54 Hundreds more
followed, but the number of health care institutions doing so remained
minute compared to the number of existing health care providers.55
In addition, twenty states passed laws addressing vaccination of
health care workers, though not all of them actually mandate
vaccination, and only three address sanctions for non-compliance.56
Let’s consider one example of a hospital-initiated mandate. In a
detailed PowerPoint, Dr. Susan Coffin from the Children’s Hospital of
Philadelphia described the hospital’s experience with an influenza

52.

Sile A. Creedon, Healthcare Workers’ Hand Decontamination Practices:
Compliance With Recommended Guidelines, 51 J. ADVANCED NURSING
208, 208 (Aug. 2005).

53.

Alexandra M. Stewart & Sara Rosenbaum, Vaccinating the Health-Care
Workforce: State Law vs. Institutional Requirements, 125 PUB. HEALTH
REP. 615, 615 (2010).

54.

Id.

55.

See Stewart & Cox, supra note 5, at 830.

56.

Id. at 829 (stating that the three states addressing compliance are
Maine, Arkansas, and Rhode Island).
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vaccination mandate.57 In July 2009, the hospital’s Patient Safety
Committee recommended requiring vaccination for all employees
working with patients or in buildings where patient care was
provided.58 The main reason given was concern over the harm not
vaccinating could pose to the patients. Dr. Coffin provided
information about adverse outcomes—up to and including death—
that had occurred to patients from influenza contracted in the
hospital pre-mandate.59
The hospital offered a medical and a religious exemption, but if
an employee refused to be vaccinated without obtaining one of those,
they were furloughed for two weeks and if they persisted, they were
terminated.60 Nine employees were terminated.61 Dr. Paul Offit, Chief
of Infectious Diseases in the Children’s Hospital in Philadelphia,
explained:
We actually mandated the vaccine, not only for health care
workers, but for all employees, and the deal was that if you
didn’t want to get the vaccine, you had 2 weeks of unpaid leave
to think about it. If you still didn’t want to get the vaccine,
then you were asked to step down from your position.62

In terms of implementing the exemptions, fifty employees
obtained a medical exemption from 2009 to 2010.63 Dr. Offit explained
that initially, he was responsible for enforcing the religious
exemption.64 When that was the case, he required the person
requesting an exemption to provide a letter from their religious leader
pointing out where, exactly, in that person’s religious texts there was
a prohibition on vaccination.65 Under that strict approach, the
57.

Susan Coffin, Carrots and Sticks: Influenza Vaccination of Healthcare
Workers (2010), http://pahcwfluvaxdotorg.files.wordpress.com/2011/
06/coffin_flu-vax-of-hcw-chop_june-20101.pdf.

58.

Id.

59.

Id.

60.

Id.

61.

Id.

62.

Paul A. Offit, Mandating Influenza Vaccine: One Hospital’s Experience
(Sept.
13,
2010),
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/
728352?src=sttwit.

63.

Coffin, supra note 57.

64.

Telephone Interview with Dr. Paul Offit, Director of the Vaccine
Education Center, at The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia (June 12,
2014).

65.

As will be discussed later, if this had gone to court, that approach
would probably have been found unconstitutional. See notes 186-188
and accompanying text.
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number of religious exemptions was extremely limited (only two such
exemptions were granted).66
In subsequent years, the hospital transferred the decision making
to a former federal judge, who adopted a more lenient approach, and
the number of religious exemptions became higher.67 Still, the vast
majority of employees complied. This is in line with the experience in
other hospitals, where mandating vaccination led to very high rates of
employees being vaccinated.68
The accommodation offered to those who received a medical or
religious exemption was wearing a facemask during influenza season,
which Dr. Offit noted is not as effective in preventing transmission of
influenza.69 Still, as explained above, the number of employees taking
advantage of the accommodation in the first years was very, very
small.
We asked Dr. Offit why the hospital provides a religious
accommodation at all, and he explained that it was not because the
hospital thought it was legally required to provide it, but rather it
was out of respect for religious values.70
In Valent v. Board of Review, a New Jersey Court of Appeals
described the way the mandate was implemented by Hackettstown
Community Hospital:
Effective September 21, 2010, Adventist Health Care, Inc., the
corporate owners of HCH, issued a policy in its “Corporate
Policy Manual” titled “Health Care Worker Flu Prevention
Plan.” The purpose of the policy was to enhance “health care
worker vaccination rates and prevent[] the spread of the flu
during the flu season or pandemic, to patients, residents, [health
care workers] and their families, as well as the community.”
Participation with the flu vaccination directive was mandatory
“unless there [was] a documented medical or religious
exemption. For those with an exemption, a declination form
66.

Coffin, supra note 57.

67.

Telephone Interview with Dr. Paul Offit, supra note 64.

68.

Bridget A. Gaughan, The Successful Implementation of Mandatory
Seasonal Influenza Vaccination for Health Care Workers at an
Academic Medical Center, 38 AM. J. INFECTION CONTROL e51, e51
(2010); R.M. Rakita et al., Mandatory Influenza Vaccination of
Healthcare Workers: A 5-Year Study, 31 INFECTION CONTROL HOSP.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 881, 881 (2010).

69.

Telephone Interview with Dr. Paul Offit, Director of the Vaccine
Education Center, at The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia (June 12,
2014). And see discussion near footnotes 144-147.

70.

Id.
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must be signed and accompanied with an appropriate note each
year. In addition, regardless of where [employees] work, for
those who must decline the flu vaccine, it will be mandatory to
properly wear a facemask (available at the facility) during the
entire flu season, to be determined by [employer] based on
[Center for Disease Control] guidelines. Failure to comply with
this policy will result in progressive discipline up to and
including termination.”71

Again, the hospital chose a policy that requires immunization and
offered a medical and religious exemption. The fate of its religious
exemption is discussed in Section III.b.
B. State Mandates

Another potential source for mandates is state-wide legislation or
regulation. Stewart and Cox reviewed state laws related to influenza
vaccination of health care workers in 2012.72 They found that twenty
states had laws on the issue, though none of them matched the model
statute Stewart and Cox proposed.73 These statutes generally required
immunization and documenting the practice, though relatively few of
them required employers to cover the cost.74
Enforcement provisions were scarce: most statutes did not require
that employees be dismissed for non-compliance or have other
sanctions, suggesting that the statutes were not exactly full
mandates.75 Only three of those states actually addressed handling
non-compliance.
In Arkansas, employers not in compliance with the vaccination
requirements will be sanctioned. Maine public health officials, on the
other hand, will exclude an HCP from work if they pose a “clear
danger to the health of others.” An exempted HCP may receive
immunization or be tested to determine their immune status. Those
who are shown to not be immune “must be excluded from the work
site during one incubation period.”76
Rhode Island differs:
Rhode Island requires HCP who are exempt from the
vaccination requirement to wear a surgical face mask when the
71.

Valent v. Bd. of Review, Dept. of Labor, 91 A.3d 644, 644-645 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).

72.

See generally Stewart & Cox, supra note 5.

73.

See id. at 829 (Table 2).

74.

Id.

75.

See id.

76.

Id. at 829.
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Department of Health declares influenza is widespread and when
the HCP is engaged in direct contact with patients. HCP who
refuse to comply are subject to a $100 fine for each act. The
HCP may be disciplined by the licensing board for
unprofessional conduct.77

Others described Rhode Island as the only state with a real
mandate.78
There have been several recent additions to states that issue
mandates via regulations. In 2012, the Colorado Board of Health
enacted rules that require licensed facilities to meet a specified
threshold of immunized workers by a set date.79 The licensing
requirements provide that:
10.6 If a licensed healthcare entity demonstrates that it has
vaccinated a targeted percentage of its employees in a given
year, using its own methodology, it shall be exempt from the
requirements of sections 10.7 through 10.12 of this Part for the
following year as long as it continues to use the same or more
stringent methodology.
(A) The minimum targets required for this exemption are:
(1) 60 percent of employees vaccinated by December 31,
2012;
(2) 75 percent of employees vaccinated by December 31,
2013; and
(3) 90 percent of employees vaccinated by December 31,
2014; and by December 31 of each year thereafter.80

Requirements 10.7-10.12 include a requirement to offer the vaccine
and document meeting the proposed set.81 Colorado offered a medical
exemption.82 The Colorado approach was to use a licensing tool to
raise immunization rates. This approach may be especially promising:
states have substantial leeway in setting health and safety
requirements as license conditions for health care facilities. The topic,
however, deserves its own treatment, and is somewhat beyond the
scope of this article.
77.

Id.

78.

Lisa H. Randall et al., Legal Considerations Surrounding Mandatory
Influenza Vaccination for Healthcare Workers in the United States, 31
VACCINE 1771, 1771 (2013).

79.

COLO. CODE REGS § 6 C.C.R. 1011-1 (2014).

80.

Id.

81.

Id.

82.

COLO. CODE REGS. § 1011-1-10.8(A)(2) (2013).
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On August 12, 2014, South Dakota’s Governor signed an
executive order requiring all state-employed health care workers to
vaccinate against influenza, unless they obtain one of the exemptions
offered—medical or religious.83 The order did not, however, mention
any sanction for non-compliance.84
In states without clear enforcement provisions, compliance is a
real issue. On July 16, 2014, Massachusetts’ Department of Public
Health released a report showing that the program, while not
inconsequential, was not as effective as hoped.85 Many hospitals failed
to comply with the target of having over 90% of the workforce
vaccinated against influenza, and many hospitals did not even meet
the reporting requirements properly.86 State officials considered taking
action by citing non-compliant hospitals.87
Note, however, that most hospitals had over 80% of workers
vaccinated—an increase compared to before the statute.88 This
example suggests that a statute—even without a direct enforcement
mechanism—helps, but more powerful enforcement provisions would
probably help more. There is evidence that hospital mandates can
lead to 98% compliance,89 and there is no reason states should not
achieve similar results.
States also varied in terms of the exemptions offered. Some
offered none, some offered only medical exemptions, and two—Maine
and New Hampshire—offered a philosophical exemption.90
Several suits were brought challenging statutes and regulations
related to influenza vaccines.91 While no court actually struck down a
83.

Exec. Order No. 2014-11, Office of the Governor, South Dakota (Aug.
12, 2014), http://doh.sd.gov/documents/order2014-11.pdf.

84.

Id. Summary of CDPHE Rule on Influenza Immunization of Healthcare
Workers,
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/
PW_Imm_Summary-of-Board-of-Health-ruling-regarding-influenzavaccination-of-health-care-workers.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2015).

85.

See Chelsea Rice, Mass. Hospital Workers’ Flu Vaccination Rates Fall
Below
Target,
BOSTON
GLOBE
(July
16,
2014),
http://www.boston.com/health/2014/07/16/mass-hospital-workers-fluvaccination-rates-fall-belowtarget/RUftxAYxnNIfBhWoJqHMNO/
story.html.

86.

Id.

87.

Id.

88.

Id.

89.

See Randall et al., supra note 78, at 1772.

90.

Stewart & Cox, supra note 5, at 829.

91.

Stewart & Rosenbaum, supra note 53, at 616-17; Wendy J. Parmet,
Pandemic Vaccines — The Legal Landscape, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1949, 1951 (2010).
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statute addressing influenza vaccination, a court in New York, where
the requirement was in regulations, issued a temporary restraining
order against the mandate in response to a case.92 Citing vaccine
shortages, the state withdrew the regulation and the case was
dismissed.93 Possibly because of this setback,94 New York changed its
regulation: now the regulation requires documentation of vaccination
status, and for those workers with no documentation, that they “wear
a surgical or procedure [sic] mask while in areas where patients or
residents may be present.”95
It’s unlikely that a mandate would be found unconstitutional if a
court had to rule on it. Since Jacobson v. Massachusetts,96 which
found that fining an individual who refuses to vaccinate is
constitutional, every state or federal court that ruled on the issue
gave states dramatic leeway to require immunization, without
requiring any non-medical exemptions.97 It’s been a long time since
Jacobson, and in those years, patient autonomy acquired substantial
importance.98 Substantial debate rages around the continued validity
of the case.99 Nevertheless, much of the logic holds: as important as
92.

See id. (discussing the challenge to the New York emergency
regulation).

93.

Id.

94.

James T. Mulder, New Ultimatum for CNY Health Care Workers this
Flu Season: Get a Shot or Wear a Mask, SYRACUSE POST STANDARD
(Oct.
22,
2013),
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/
2013/10/new_ultimatum_for_cny_health_care_workers_this_flu_sea
son_get_a_shot_or_wear_a_m.html.

95.

Nirav R. Shah, DAL: DAL-NH-13-04: Flu Mask Requirements, N.Y.
DEP’T OF HEALTH (July 17, 2013), https://www.health.ny.gov/
professionals/nursing_home_administrator/dal_nh_1304_flu_mask_requirement.htm.

96.

Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31-32 (1905).

97.

Dorit R. Reiss, Thou Shalt Not Take the Name of the Lord Thy God in
Vain: Use and Abuse of Religious Exemptions from School
Immunization Requirements, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1551, 1558-60 (2014).

98.

Jaime S. King & Benjamin Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The
Case for Shared Medical Decision- Making, 32 AM. J. LAW & MED. 429,
429-30 (2006).

99.

See, e.g., Michael H. Shapiro, Updating Constitutional Doctrine: An
Extended Response to the Critique of Compulsory Vaccination, 12 YALE
J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 87, 95-96 (2012); Ben Horowitz, A Shot
in the Arm: What a Modern Approach to Jacobson v. Massachusetts
Means for Mandatory Vaccinations During a Public Health Emergency,
60 AM. U. L. REV. 1715, 1730-31 (2011); Christopher Richins, J.D.,
LL.M., Jacobson Revisited an Argument for Strict Judicial Scrutiny of
Compulsory Vaccination, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 409, 410 (2011); Lawrence
O. Gostin, Jacobson v. Massachusetts at 100 Years: Police Power and
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individual liberty is, sometimes it must be put aside for the public
good. For example, we still have laws allowing quarantining of
individuals in certain circumstances.100 If we apply the rational basis
test to the question of mandatory immunization, upholding influenza
requirements is an easy question: it’s rational to aim to reduce
morbidity and mortality from a disease like influenza.101
We can argue that a person’s autonomy to choose or reject a
medical procedure is part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, subject to a strict scrutiny standard.102 But even under a
strict scrutiny standard, a state would have a powerful argument
supporting the statute. Protecting vulnerable patients from a disease
that can kill or severely hurt them is a compelling interest. In
Workman v. Mingo Board of Education, the Fourth Circuit found
that a “state’s wish to prevent the spread of communicable diseases
clearly constitutes a compelling interest.”103 And as discussed more in
depth in Section III, there really is no good substitute to vaccination
for preventing influenza. Masks, though they have been used in the
past, are of limited effectiveness.104 Before resorting to mandates,
Civil Liberties in Tension, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 576, 580 (2005);
James Colgrove & Ronald Bayer, Manifold Restraints: Liberty, Public
Health and the Legacy of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 95 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH, 571, 575 (2005); Wendy K. Mariner et al., Jacobson v.
Massachusetts: It’s Not your Great-Great-Grandfather’s Public Health
Law, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 581, 586 (2005); Note, Toward a TwentyFirst-Century Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 182122 (2008); Wendy E. Parmet et al., Plenary Program: Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 24, 26 (2005).
100. JASON W. SAPSIN, CENTER FOR LAW & THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH AT
GEORGETOWN AND JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITIES, PUBLIC HEALTH LEGAL
PREPAREDNESS BRIEFING MEMORANDUM #41: OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL
AND STATE QUARANTINE AUTHORITY, CENTER FOR LAW AND THE
PUBLIC’S
HEALTH,
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/
ResourcesPDFs/4quarantine.pdf
101. Ottenberg et al, supra note 26, at 214.
102. Dorit Reiss & Lois Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination
Crisis: Legal Frameworks and Tools in the Context of Parental Vaccine
Refusal, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 881, 897 (2015).
103. Workman v. Mingo Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348, 353–54 (4th
Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
104. B.J. Cowling et al., Face Masks to Prevent Transmission of Influenza
Virus: A Systematic Review, 138 EPIDEMIOLOGY AND INFECTION 449, 449
(2010); Allison E. Aiello et al., Mask Use, Hand Hygiene, and Seasonal
Influenza-Like Illness Among Young Adults: A Randomized Intervention
Trial, 201 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 491, 491 (2010); Chandini R.
MacIntyre et al., A Cluster Randomized Clinical Trial Comparing FitTested and Non-Fit-Tested N95 Respirators to Medical Masks to
Prevent Respiratory Virus Infection in Health Care Workers, 5 J.
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hospitals tried other ways to increase vaccination rates, including
education and declination forms.105 While not completely ineffective,
those methods only led to a very modest increase in immunization
rates.106 It appears that there really is no good substitute to vaccine
mandates in this context. Even under strict scrutiny review, therefore,
there is a strong argument that a mandate is constitutional.107
Patients in a hospital are not just any person on the street; they are
vulnerable individuals placing themselves literally in the hands of
health care workers, relying on their care.108 Acting to protect them is
even more imperative than acting to protect citizens’ lives generally—
and protection of life is already a powerful argument.
C. Employer-initiated Mandates: Legal Limits

The situation for mandates is somewhat different for an employer.
Employment in the United States is generally at-will, which means
that employers have quite a bit of leeway to set work conditions and
to dismiss workers who refuse to meet those conditions and
requirements. Specifically, every state except Montana has a
presumption of at-will employment, which means the employee can be
fired for any reason or no reason at all.109 This presumption can be
overcome if there is an implied-in-fact contract, for example, a
handbook with employment contracts that set limits on firing. But
the majority rule is that if there is such a contract, the employer can
unilaterally change the policy as long as they give the employees
notice and it doesn’t interfere with vested interests.110
INFLUENZA AND OTHER RESPIRATORY VIRUSES 170, 170 (2011); Faisal
bin-Reza et al., The Use of Masks and Respirators to Prevent
Transmission of Influenza: A Systematic Review of the Scientific
Evidence, 6 J. INFLUENZA & OTHER RESPIRATORY VIRUSES 257, 257
(2011).
105. K.A. Bryant et al., Improving Influenza Immunization Rates Among
Healthcare Workers Caring for High-Risk Pediatric Patients, 25
INFECTION CONTROL & HOSPITAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 912, 912 (2004); Tehri
Tapiainen et al., Influenza Vaccination Among Healthcare Workers in a
University Children’s Hospital, 26 INFECTION CONTROL & HOSPITAL
EPIDEMIOLOGY 855, 855 (2005).
106. Bryant, supra note 105, at 912. See also Coffin, supra note 60.
107. Stewart & Rosenbaum, supra note 53, at 616-17.
108. Caplan, supra note 26.
109. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West); Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R.
Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) (an employer could fire his employees
for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all, including firing
employees for shopping at a non-company owned store).
110. Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 81 (Cal. 2000) (“As discussed, our
employment cases support application of contract principles in the
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Employers may not discriminate in hiring, promotion or retention
because of disability or because of one of the bases included in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—”race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”111 Aside from those restrictions, an employer has
substantial leeway to require that employees adhere to conditions set.
Non-unionized workers, therefore, cannot attack influenza
mandates set by a private employer except through the lens of the
Americans with Disabilities Act112 or The Civil Rights Act, 1964.113
Neither law directly prevents mandates, although employees will
probably argue they mandate exemptions (see Section III for that
discussion).
The situation may be different for unionized workers. The
question is whether immunization requirements are subject to
collective bargaining. At least one court answered in the affirmative.114
In 2004, after a voluntary immunization program still left the staff
immunization rate at 55%, Virginia Mason Hospital circulated a
memo announcing a mandatory influenza immunization program.115
Under the policy, anyone who did not have a religious objection or
documented vaccine allergy would have to show proof of vaccination
by January 1, 2005, or face termination “unless he or she agreed to

decision whether an employer may unilaterally terminate an
employment security policy that has become an implied-in-fact
unilateral contract. Under contract theory, an employer may terminate
a unilateral contract of indefinite duration, as long as its action occurs
after a reasonable time, and is subject to prescribed or implied
limitations, including reasonable notice and preservation of vested
benefits. The facts clearly show that employees enjoyed the benefits of
the MESP for a reasonable time period, and that Pacific Bell gave its
employees reasonable and ample notice of its intent to terminate the
MESP. The company also did not at any time interfere with employees’
vested benefits in effecting the MESP termination. In addition, the
employees accepted the company’s modified policy by continuing to
work in light of the modification. Therefore, in response to the Ninth
Circuit’s certification request, we conclude that we should answer as
follows: An employer may terminate a written employment security
policy that contains a specified condition, if the condition is one of
indefinite duration and the employer makes the change after a
reasonable time, on reasonable notice, and without interfering with the
employees’ vested benefits.”) (citations omitted).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964) (“The Civil Rights Act”).
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (1990).
113. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (1964).
114. Stewart & Rosenbaum, supra note 53, at 616.
115. Va. Mason Hosp. v. Wash. Nurses Ass’n, 511 F.3d 908, 912 (9th Cir.
2007).
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take flu prophylaxis medication at his or her own expense.”116 The
Washington State Nurses Association, a union, filed a grievance that
went to an arbitrator.117 The arbitrator interpreted the Collective
Bargaining Agreement as requiring the employer to negotiate with the
union on this issue and the federal district court upheld the
arbitrator’s interpretation.118 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
turn, upheld the District Court’s decision.119 Note, however, that the
basis for the Ninth Circuit’s decision was the high level of deference
due to the arbitrator’s interpretation of the specific collective
bargaining agreement at issue, not a decision about mandatory
immunization policies and collective bargaining in general.120
After the Ninth Circuit decision, the hospital adopted, apparently
still unilaterally, a policy requiring extensive mask use from nonvaccinated employees, and the union appealed that policy, this time
to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), as an unfair labor
practice.121 After somewhat complex proceedings, the NLRB rejected
the hospital’s claim that it did not have to negotiate on masks
because the issue was part of its core purposes under the Peerless
standard and remanded the decision to the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) to decide on the rest of the hospital’s claims.122 The ALJ
decided—and the NLRB affirmed—that the union waived the
requirement of collective bargaining by agreeing to a specific clause—
the management-rights clause—in the collective bargaining
agreement.123
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Va. Mason Hosp. v. Wash. Nurses Ass’n, No. C05-1434MJP, 2006 WL
27203, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 5, 2006), aff’d, 511 F.3d 908 (9th Cir.
2007).
119. Va. Mason Hosp., 511 F.3d at 917-18.
120. Va. Mason Hosp., 2006 WL 27203 at *7.
121. WSNA Leads Fight for Nurses’ Rights on Flu Policies (July 27, 2012),
http://www.wsna.org/labor/Victories/MandatoryImmunization/documents/VMMC-2012-07.pdf.
122. Va. Mason Hosp. (a Div. of Va. Mason Hosp. Ctr.) and Wash. Nurses
Ass’n, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 5 (Aug. 23, 2011); Peerless Publ’ns, Inc. &
Newspaper Guild of Greater Phila. Local 10, 283 N.L.R.B. 334, 335-336
(1987) (setting a test under which some decisions are exempt from
collective bargaining, if the subject matter goes to “the protection of the
core purposes of the enterprise,” the rule is “narrowly tailored” to meet
that objective, and appropriately limited to relevant employees to
achieve the objectives).
123. Supplemental Decision and Order, Va. Mason Hosp. (a Div. of Va.
Mason Hosp. Ctr.) and Wash. Nurses Ass’n, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 1-2
(June 25, 2012).
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We do not know what, exactly, happened. It could be that the
union was not amenable to accepting a flu mandate—Washington is a
state with relatively high rates of exemptions from school
immunization requirements,124 suggesting a relatively sizable antivaccine contingency (still a small minority, but larger than in other
states). It could be that the management acted in a heavy-handed
manner and the contentious issue was really the power to decide
rather than the influenza vaccine mandate itself.
So, what is the takeaway from Virginia Mason Hospital? We
believe it is that a hospital facing a unionized workforce may be
limited in its ability to impose a mandatory immunization policy
without bargaining with the union. A hospital cannot assume that its
mandatory immunization policies will be upheld against unionized
workers if they were not reached via collective bargaining. The
specific limits will heavily depend on the collective bargaining
agreement’s contents. The safe course for a hospital faced with a
unionized workforce is to bargain about influenza immunization
policies and try to get the union on board. If the union will not
bargain, or if an agreement cannot be reached, whether a court will
uphold the hospital’s policy will depend on the specifics of the
collective bargaining agreement as interpreted by the decision maker.
Other struggles around unionized workers also showed that an
employer may face trouble applying a mandatory immunization policy
to the unionized workers without bargaining with the union first,
though the result is uncertain.125 However, even in Virginia Mason
Hospital, “vaccination coverage among unionized inpatient nurses in
this medical center increased from 85.9% to 95.8% between 2005 and
2010, potentially indicating that mandatory vaccination increased
facility-wide coverage, even among exempted union workers.”126 In
other words, even after the court’s initial decision that unionized
workers were not required to vaccinate, the mandatory policy still in
place for non-unionized workers continued to achieve high rates of
immunization.

III. Exemptions: What is Required?
This subsection analyzes what is required once a state or
employer decides to impose a mandatory influenza immunization
124. See Ranee Seither et al., Vaccination Coverage Among Children in
Kindergarten, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 607, 610-11
(August 2, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/
mm6230a3.htm.
125. Randall, et al., supra note 78, at 1773.
126. Id.
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policy. An employer or a state may choose to offer certain exemptions
from the requirements. Experience suggests that the exemptions used
in the health care worker context mimic those of school immunization
requirements, including medical, religious, and in a minority of cases
philosophical exemptions.127 This section explores what the options
and limits in terms of exemptions are. Are any exemptions required?
If so, which? And what are the limits on the content of an exemption?
A. Medical Exemptions

The first type of exemption is a medical exemption. The CDC
recognizes that some individuals with specific medical problems
should not be vaccinated.128 For the injected influenza vaccine, which
contains inactivated viruses, a “[s]evere allergic reaction (e.g.,
anaphylaxis) after a previous dose of any IIV or LAIV or to a vaccine
component, including egg protein” is a contraindication, and the CDC
lists it as a reason not to get the vaccine.129 For the nasal mist, which
contains attenuated viruses, contraindications are a “[s]evere allergic
reaction (e.g., anaphylaxis) after a previous dose of IIV or LAIV or to
a vaccine component, including egg protein” and “[c]onditions for
which the ACIP recommends against use, but which are not
contraindications in vaccine package insert: immune suppression,
certain chronic medical conditions such as asthma, diabetes, heart or
kidney disease, and pregnancy.”130
Should a state passing a statute, or an employer mandating
vaccination, offer a medical exemption? Let’s begin with Jacobson v.
Massachusetts.131 The statute challenged in Jacobson included an
exemption from vaccination for “children certified by a registered
physician to be unfit subjects for vaccination,” but had no equivalent
exception for adults.132 In response, the Court said,
127. See Stewart & Cox, supra note 5, at 831; Randall et al., supra note 78,
at 1772.
128. Chart of Contraindications and Precautions to Commonly Used
Vaccines,
CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/vac-admin/
contraindications-vacc.htm (last updated Mar. 6, 2014).
129. Id. However, it’s not clear that egg allergy is, in fact, a bar to getting
the influenza vaccine. See Jonathan Spergel,
Vaccines and Egg
Allergies: Can People With Egg Allergies Get Vaccines?, CHILDREN’S
HOSPITAL
OF
PHILADELPHIA,
http://www.chop.edu/centersprograms/vaccine-education-center/vaccine-ingredients/eggproducts#.VvMyw-IrJpg (“Advances in technology have allowed the
quantities in current influenza vaccines given as shots to be so minimal
that people with egg allergies can now receive the influenza shot.”).
130. Chart of Contraindications, supra note 128.
131. Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
132. Id. at 30.
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[T]his cannot be deemed a denial of the equal protection of the
laws to adults; for the statute is applicable equally to all in like
condition, and there are obviously reasons why regulations may
be appropriate for adults which could not be safely applied to
persons of tender years.133

In other words, applying a medical exemption only to children and
not to adults is not a constitutional problem because there are real
differences between adults and children.
But that’s not all the case said. Rejecting Jacobson’s claim of
medical risk, apparently based on an adverse reaction as a child, the
Court highlighted that Jacobson did not substantiate his argument:
[D]efendant did not offer to prove that, by reason of his then
condition, he was in fact not a fit subject of vaccination at the
time he was informed of the requirement of the regulation
adopted by the board of health. It is entirely consistent with his
offer of proof that, after reaching full age, he had become, so far
as medical skill could discover, and when informed of the
regulation of the board of health was, a fit subject of
vaccination.134

While the Court did not expressly rule on what would have happened
had Jacobson proven a specific medical problem, it at least implies
that such a problem would impact the result. This suggests that it
may at least be unconstitutional to require vaccinations for people
with medical conditions that make vaccinating dangerous—such as
people with contraindications.
This is probably an appropriate result, and should be kept today:
the rationale behind contraindications is that those individuals are
put at risk by being vaccinated. Requiring them to sacrifice their
health or worse for vaccinating is probably asking too much. Rather,
those people will be protected by herd immunity.135 Since such
reactions are extremely rare,136 the number of people with
contraindications is probably small enough to keep rates of
vaccination in hospitals very, very high.
On the other hand, one could ask whether it’s appropriate to
allow people who cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons to have
133. Id.
134. Id. at 36-37.
135. David S. Stephens, Vaccines for the Unvaccinated: Protecting the Herd,
197 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 643, 645 (2008).
136. Seasonal Influenza Vaccine Safety: A Summary for Clinicians, CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/vaccination/vaccine_safety.htm
(last updated Dec. 12, 2014).
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access to vulnerable patients. The discussion is not, after all, whether
it’s appropriate to tie people with contraindications down and force
vaccinate them or to penalize them criminally for not vaccinating. If
the reason for not vaccinating is medical, there is no fault in not
doing so, but there may still be good reason to deny people with those
conditions access to vulnerable patients to whom they might transmit
influenza. It’s not a matter of penalty nor is it a matter of blame: the
patient’s interest in being protected against influenza stands in
opposition to the health care worker’s interest in working in the
medical field and to the public’s need for qualified and caring health
care professionals.
Legislatively, it seems close enough that the state should have
some leeway to decide if, in that state’s specific circumstances, the
existence of a medical exemption too seriously undermines the
protection of patients’ right to health and life, which as discussed, is a
compelling state interest. There is, however, at least a potential
argument that a medical exemption is constitutionally required under
Jacobson.137
There is an additional factor for both public and private
employers to consider. In addition to constitutional requirements that
may force a public employer to offer a medical exemption, the
Americans with Disabilities Act138 may impose requirements. Sections
12112(a) and (b) of the ADA require employers not to discriminate
against disabled workers—a category that is broad enough to include
those with contraindications—if they can, with reasonable
accommodation, still do the job.139 Generally, this means that an
employer
should
accommodate
workers
with
medical
contraindications, as the EEOC explained in a memo on the topic.140
There is an exemption in the ADA if the employer can demonstrate
“undue hardship” on its operation 141 or, under our jurisprudence, on
fellow employees.142 This is a fairly high bar requiring “significant”
difficulty or expense.143 Factors to consider include the cost of the
137. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 36-37. See also Reiss & Weithorn, supra note
102, at 920.
138. See 42 U.S.C § 12101 et seq. (1990).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)-(b).
140. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, PANDEMIC
PREPAREDNESS IN THE WORKPLACE AND THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/pandemic_flu.html (last
modified Oct. 9, 2009).
141. 42 U.S.C §12112(b)(5)(A) (1990).
142. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002).
143. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(1) (1991).
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accommodation, which includes sources available to offset it; the resources
of the facility, size and numbers of employees; the type of operations; and
the impact of the accommodation on the facility’s operations and on other
employees.144
The most commonly used accommodation for employees with
contraindications is a facemask. Its effectiveness in preventing
influenza, however, has been challenged, with some claiming that by
itself it is not particularly effective.145 As discussed above in Section
III(B), if a regular mask does not properly protect—or if there’s not
good evidence that it does, in fact, protect—then it’s not a reasonable
accommodation. A reasonable accommodation is one that allows an
employee to fill her essential functions without violating her religious
beliefs.146 Something that does not prevent influenza is not a
substitute for something that does, and risking a patient’s health in
the absence of good evidence that masks work is asking quite a bit. A
heavier mask such as an N95 respirator may be more effective, though
even there the evidence is mixed, 147 but getting them, especially if
they are not used regularly, and making sure they are being used
properly at all times may be a significant expense.148 While this may
mean that those masks are a reasonable accommodation, the cost may
be seen as an undue burden. That will be a question of fact.
Furthermore, there is an additional problem for both masks and
N95 respirators. Vaccination is a passive precaution: get it one time
and you’re done, and receipt of a vaccine is relatively easy to monitor.
All the employer needs to check is that the employee received his or
her annual influenza vaccine. Alternatives such as masks are
continuous precautions: they need to be used constantly to work. It is
very human to forget or to not properly use a mask, so using masks as
an alternative may require employers to invest more in monitoring,
potentially making the precaution an undue burden.
Because of this, masks may not be a reasonable accommodation.
144. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(p)(2) (1991).
145. Loeb, supra note 51, at 1870 (noting the concerns over reduced efficacy).
146. See generally Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the Playing Field or Stacking
the Deck?: The “Unfair Advantage” Critique of Perceived Disability
Claims, 78 N.C. L. REV. 901, 913 (2000).
147. See Loeb, supra note 51, at 1870; C. Raina MacIntyre et al., Efficacy of
Face Masks and Respirators in Preventing Upper Respiratory Tract
Bacterial Colonization and Co-Infection in Hospital Healthcare
Workers, 62 PREVENTIVE MED.1, 5 (2014).
148. See Gio Baracco et al., Comparative Cost of Stockpiling Various Types
of Respiratory Protective Devices to Protect the Health Care Workforce
During an Influenza Pandemic, 9 DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH
PREPAREDNESS 313 (2015).
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The potential for loss of life from patients infected by non-vaccinated
personnel is a substantial burden—few burdens can be higher than
unnecessary, preventable deaths—which would allow employers not to
provide this accommodation. Nevertheless, employers can still choose
to provide the alternative anyway. There is an argument they’re not
required to; but because masks may be at least somewhat effective,
there is also an argument that the burden is not high enough to
exempt employers from the ADA.
Another possible accommodation is reassignment: workers with
medical contraindications can be reassigned, at least during flu
season, so as not to work with patients.149 This raises two problems: it
can lead to staffing shortages in areas that require patient care,
undermining the hospitals operations; and it can harm other
workers.150 Reassignment raises issues such as where the reassigned
personnel will work. Will reassigned employees have to be assigned
jobs that are, from their point of view, less desirable?
Finally, some argue that that non-vaccinated employees can be
seen as a direct threat, and hence the ADA would support vaccine
mandates—though proponents acknowledge this has not yet been
done.151 The direct threat doctrine is embodied in § 12113(b).152 The
provision is vague, and courts have not given it much more
substance.153 However, one area in which it had been applied is to
health care workers that may endanger patients in contexts that
included, among others, HIV infection or alcoholism.154 In those cases,
courts, while attempting to evaluate the scientific and medical
evidence, offered a high level of deference to the employer’s
assessment of the level of threat.155 Here, too, courts are very likely to
defer to employers’ judgment that an unvaccinated health care worker
poses a direct threat to patients, especially those from vulnerable
categories.
149. Andrew T. Pavia, Mandate to Protect Patients from Health CareAssociated Influenza, 50 Clinical Infectious Diseases 465, 465 (2010).
150. Befort, Stephan, The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation
Issues: Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 Wake Forest L. Rev.
439, 441-442 (2002).
151. See Randall et al., supra note 78, at 1773-74.
152. 42 U.S.C. §12113(b) (2009) (stating that qualification standards “may
include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to
the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace”).
153. See Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Typhoid Mary” Meets the ADA: A Case
Study of the ‘Direct Threat’ Standard Under The Americans With
Disabilities Act, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 863-67 (1999).
154. Id. at 869.
155. Id. at 871.
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Still, because the bar is relatively high under the ADA, hospitals
may be required to provide a medical exemption and accommodations
to workers with medical contraindications, though it will be a case-bycase, situation-dependent question.
B. Religious Exemptions

In considering religious exemptions, the first two questions to
consider are whether they are required in the first place and, if they
are adopted, whether there are requirements as to the content. The
answer to these questions affects the choice of whether to provide
religious exemptions.
1.

Constitutionally Required?

The Constitution binds state actors. This includes not only states
passing statutes requiring vaccination of health care workers, but also
public hospitals. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), which monitors the application of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 by employers (see below), also adheres to our First Amendment
jurisprudence in implementing the act. Understanding the way our
courts interpret the First Amendment in this context is therefore
critical.
The First Amendment says, in the relevant part, that “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”156 Both the establishment of
religion157 and the free exercise of it158 were incorporated—applied to
the states—via the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The question is whether the First Amendment requires state actors to
offer a religious exemption to vaccines. Jacobson predates the
incorporation of the First Amendment towards the states, but
subsequent jurisprudence strongly suggests that the answer is no.
Prince v. Massachusetts addressed whether religious freedom
trumps child labor laws, and answered in the negative.159 In dicta, the
court in Prince went on to say that a parent “cannot claim freedom
from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on
religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease
or the latter to ill health or death.”160 Prince came after Cantwell, so
the free exercise clause already applied to the state, and the Prince
156. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
157. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 5 (1947).
158. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
159. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944).
160. Id. at 166-67.

389

Health Matrix·Volume 26·Issue 1·2016
First Do No Harm: Protecting Patients
Through Immunizing Health Care Workers

court acknowledged the weight of it. But this dicta in Prince
reaffirmed that the state has the power to require immunization to
protect the public health.
This interpretation had been relied on in subsequent state and
federal cases. For example, in 2011 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Workman v. Mingo Board of Education rejected a
challenge to West Virginia’s lack of religious exemption.161 The Court
said:
[T]he state’s wish to prevent the spread of communicable
diseases clearly constitutes a compelling interest. In sum,
following the reasoning of Jacobson and Prince, we conclude
that the West Virginia statute requiring vaccinations as a
condition of admission to school does not unconstitutionally
infringe Workman’s right to free exercise. This conclusion is
buttressed by the opinions of numerous federal and state courts
that have reached similar conclusions in comparable cases.162

Still, we could raise a question on whether Prince does, indeed,
definitively address the issue. Prince addressed a situation of parental
rights over children. In addition to the public health, another
important interest came into play there: the rights of the child. The
Prince dicta addressed both. There is an argument that Prince does
not allow states to overcome religious freedoms where there is not a
similar compilation of interests, such as a mixture of both children’s
rights and public health. In the context of health care workers and
flu, we do not have such a circumstance; the tension—assuming the
religious opposition is sincere163—is between the freedom of religion for
health workers and public health, including the welfare of patients,
some of whom may be children.
Later Supreme Court jurisprudence addressed this kind of tension,
though not in the context of vaccination. The most important case is
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith.164 In Smith, the Supreme Court overturned previous precedents
by ruling that a state can apply a “neutral law of general
applicability”165 to those with religious objections, except in cases
where another Constitutional right besides freedom of religion was

161. Workman v. Mingo Cty. Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348, 353-54 (4th
Cir. 2011).
162. Id. (citations omitted).
163. See footnotes 192-196 and the accompanying text.
164. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
165. Id. at 878-79.
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implicated.166 As recently explained by the Supreme Court in Hobby
Lobby, “The Court therefore held that, under the First Amendment,
“neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious
practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental
interest.” 167The Hobby Lobby majority treated Smith as the starting
point for a First Amendment analysis and based its decision on
RFRA’s deviation from Smith, clearly leaving Smith untouched. 168
The dissent expressed even stronger support for Smith.169
Under this jurisprudence, a general requirement of mandatory
influenza vaccination with no religious exemption does not violate the
First Amendment even without a showing of compelling interest.
Of course, protecting the life of vulnerable patients from influenza
can be seen as a compelling interest. Under the compelling interest
analysis, however, one must show that mandatory influenza
vaccination is the least restrictive means of achieving the goal—a high
standard, as Hobby Lobby demonstrates.170 That said, as discussed
more in detail above in relation to accommodations, it’s not clear that
there is a viable alternative for protecting vulnerable patients: hand
washing and masks reduce the infection rate, but vaccination on top
of them reduces it even more. Without vaccination, there will be a
cost in life. The CDC recommends both hand washing and
vaccinating.171 Reassigning may be impractical and at the very least is
extremely burdensome. As also discussed, hospitals have tried
education and other means before moving to mandates—and those
were not sufficiently effective. This suggests that a mandate is, in
fact, the least restrictive means.
The best conclusion, therefore, is that states enacting statutes
mandating influenza vaccinations and public hospitals requiring its
employees to vaccinate are not required to offer a religious exemption
under our jurisprudence.
2. Legally Required Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Both public and private employers have to take into account the
limits on employment discrimination embedded in Title VII of the
166. Id. at 877.
167. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014)
(citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997)).
168. Id. at 2761-62.
169. Id, at 2790 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2780.
171. CDC, CDC Says “Take 3” Actions To Fight The Flu,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/preventing.htm (last updated Sept. 9,
2014).
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Civil Rights Act of 1964.172 Title VII prohibits discrimination based
on religion (and other attributes not relevant to this paper) in hiring,
firing, compensating and promoting employees.173 For religion, an
employer is required to “reasonably accommodate” an employee’s
“religious observance or practice” unless doing so will be an “undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”174
Does Title VII require employers to accommodate employees’
opposition to influenza vaccination if it is based on sincere religious
objection? In practice, as discussed above, employers have offered
exemptions and required facemask usage with varying requirements as
an accommodation. Another potential accommodation is for
employers to reassign employees with religious objections to a role
that does not involve working with patients or with those that work
with patients—for example, in a separate building. However, there is
an extremely strong case that neither accommodation is required
under the Civil Rights Act as interpreted by our courts. To begin, as
explained above, a mask is not effective in preventing transmission. A
reasonable accommodation is a question of fact,175 and the question of
what is reasonable accommodation in the context of influenza vaccine
mandates has not been directly addressed by the courts, to the best of
our knowledge. But, if the mask does not prevent infection, the goal
of the policy—to prevent infecting patients—will not be achieved. An
accommodation that undermines the goal of the rule is not an
accommodation an employer is reasonably required to offer.176
This claim can be challenged by highlighting that an employee
has a duty to offer reasonable accommodation of some kind unless
such accommodation causes undue hardship.177 But both suggested
accommodations—wearing a mask and reassignment during flu
season—are not required under the undue hardship analysis, either.
Courts have interpreted the undue hardship standard to impose a
very low bar. An accommodation imposes an undue hardship if it
imposes “more than de minimis cost” on the operation of the
employer’s business.178
172. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964).
173. Id.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1964).
175. Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987).
176. See EEOC v. Oak-Rite Mfg. Corp., No. IP99–1962–C–H/G, 2001 WL
1168156, at *9 (S.D. Ind. Aug 27, 2001); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v.
Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1986).
177. Id.
178. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (“To
require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give
Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.”).
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As already discussed, a mask is a continuous precaution, like
washing hands. This kind of precaution is much more vulnerable to
employees forgetting, neglecting, or otherwise ignoring the
requirement to wear a mask. It’s much harder to enforce than a onetime precaution, like installing seatbelts or getting a shot. Moreover,
as explained above, the mask’s effectiveness is debatable, and likely
low: it may well not prevent transmission. Given the ineffectiveness of
masks and the difficulties of enforcing their use, the cost of allowing
them could be more sick or dead patients. That’s a substantial burden
for the operation of a business. In a previous case, a court found that
an employer was not required to accommodate an employee’s religious
opposition to wearing pants because there was evidence that wearing
other clothes created a safety hazard.179 While that case focused on
the safety of the employee, the safety of patients is no less valuable.
Experimenting with patients’ safety—or sacrificing it—is an undue
burden. While the N-95 respirator may be more effective, as
discussed, requiring employers to provide them when they do not
normally carry enough to cover constant use is more than a de
minimis burden.
Reassigning will also often be a substantial burden: it can deprive
the hospital of trained workers available to work with patients,
leading to those areas being understaffed and patients being
underserved. It can also be a burden on other employees— either
those who will have to shoulder additional tasks because of
reassignment, or those without religious objections that will have to
be reassigned in turn to make room for the objecting employee.
Employers are not required to reassign employees if doing so will
impose a burden on other employees.180 Nor is an employer required to
reassign an employee if that will violate seniority.181 While the burden
of reassignment is a factual question, in many circumstances
reassignment would be a burden either on the employer or on other
employees. Even more, reassigning in the same building may not
solve the problem—the employee may still infect others who may then
infect patients.
In short, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does not require
179. E.E.O.C. v. Oak-Rite Mfg. Corp., 2001 WL 1168156at *1 (“The
accommodation that the EEOC suggests—’a reasonably close-fitting,
denim or canvas dress/skirt that extends to within two or three inches
above the ankle’…would impose an undue hardship on Oak–Rite by
requiring it to experiment with employee safety…No evidence shows that
the proposed solution has worked safely in any comparable
manufacturing setting.”).
180. See Trans World Airlines, Inc., 432 U.S. at 81.
181. Id. at 82-83. See also Stolley v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 228
F. App’x 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2007).
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employers to offer a religious exemption. Even if we see wearing a
mask or reassignment as potential reasonable accommodations, these
accommodations impose an undue burden on employers and may
create too high a risk for patients’ health and life.
3. Religious Exemptions: Constitutional Limits on Content

If a state or an employer chooses to offer a religious
accommodation even though it is not required—which is possible
given the high place religious values occupy in the United States
society182—Constitutional jurisprudence, mostly decided in the context
of school immunization requirements, imposes some important limits
on the content of such an accommodation.183
First, in terms of content, our jurisprudence defines religious
beliefs very broadly to include “moral, ethical, or religious beliefs
about what is right and wrong …[that are] held with the strength of
traditional religious convictions.”184 The EEOC adopts a similarly
broad approach in its interpretation of title VII.185 The definition is
not limitless—it does not extend to political opinions or safety
concerns, for example—but it is broad.186
Part of this broad definition is the idea that the exemption cannot
be limited to organized religions.187 Nor can those implementing a
religious exemption deny one to someone on the grounds that the
182. Pew Research Center,”Nones” on the Rise: One-in-Five Adults Have No
Religious
Affiliation,
at
1,
17
(Oct.
9,
2012),
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2012/10/NonesOnTheRise-full.pdf
(stating that the number of Americans who say religion is important in
their lives is 58%, as compared to Britain at 17%, France at 13%,
Germany at 21%, and Spain at 22%); see also KENNETH D. WALD &
ALLISON CALHOUN-BROWN, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED
STATES 11-16 (5th ed. 2007). As already mentioned, Dr. Paul Offit
explained CHOP’s decision to offer a religious exemption out of
recognition of the importance of religion in the United States rather
than any fears of legal liability. Offit, supra note 69.
183. See Reiss, supra note 97, at 1558-60.
184. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970).
COMPLIANCE
MANUAL
6-7
(Jul.
22,
2008),
185. EEOC
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.pdf. While the EEOC’s
guidance document is not law, since in this case it simply encapsulates
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and the principle of nondiscrimination between religious beliefs, it probably holds.
186. Slater v. King Soopers, 809 F. Supp. 809, 810 (D. Colo. Dec. 31, 1992)
(explaining that a Ku Klux Klan member fired for participating in a
rally was not discriminated against on religious grounds because “the
KKK is not a religion for purposes of Title VII. Rather the KKK is
political and social in nature.”).
187. See, e.g., Dalli v. Bd. of Educ., 267 N.E.2d 219, 222-23 (Mass. 1971).
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official position of that person’s religion does not oppose vaccines. A
person is permitted to have her or his own interpretation of religious
requirements, even if that interpretation is in tension with the official
religion’s position.188 Nor can an exemption be denied because a belief
appears to the employer irrational or non-credible.189 This is because
state actors should not have the power to act as “conscience police”
evaluating religious beliefs.190 The meaning of this, however, is that
these kinds of exemptions, if offered, are vulnerable to abuse.191
States or employers may require a showing of sincerity as a
condition for an exemption. In fact, under some interpretations, Title
VII could require such a showing.192 Note that for state statutes, in
the context of school exemptions, states have found that officials may
not impose such a requirement unless the statute itself requires
sincerity—i.e., it cannot be read in by the administrators applying the
statute.193 For example, in order to evaluate sincerity, New York
engages in a detailed process to examine what the person seeking an
exemption said and potentially also interrogating the applicant.194
There is quite some leeway to evaluate sincerity under Title VII.
188. Berg v. Glen Cove City Sch. Dist., 853 F. Supp. 651, 655 (E.D.N.Y.
June 1, 1994).
189. Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 932 (4th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the
argument that witchcraft was a “conglomeration” of “various aspects of
the occult” rather than a religion, stating that religious beliefs need not
be “acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to others” to be
protected) (internal quotation marks omitted).
190. Reiss, supra note 97, at 1558.
191. Id. at 1588.
192. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (“the threshold
question of sincerity ... must be resolved in every case.”). See also
Bushouse v. Local Union 2209, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.
Implement Workers of Am., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1075 (N.D. Ind.
2001) (“Given the purpose of the protections and special
accommodations afforded by Title VII, the court concludes that Title
VII does permit an inquiry into the sincerity and religious nature of an
employee or member’s purported beliefs before the duty to accommodate
such a belief arises”).
193. In re LePage, 18 P.3d 1177, 1180 (Wyo. 2001) (“[T]he statutory
language lacks any mention of an inquiry by the state into the sincerity
of religious beliefs. As a result, the Department of Health exceeded its
legislative authority when it conducted a further inquiry into the
sincerity of Mrs. LePage’s religious beliefs.”). For a detailed analysis of
this, see Dep’t of Health v. Curry, 722 So. 2d 874, 878–79 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998).
194. See, e.g., Check ex rel. MC, No. 13–cv–791 (SLT)(LB), 2013 WL
2181045, at *7-8 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2013); Farina v. Bd. of Educ., 116
F. Supp. 2d 503, 510-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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The EEOC explains the criteria that can be used to assess an
employee’s sincerity in the context of a Title VII claim:
Factors that—either alone or in combination—might undermine
an employee’s assertion that he sincerely holds the religious
belief at issue include: whether the employee has behaved in a
manner markedly inconsistent with the professed belief;
whether the accommodation sought is a particularly desirable
benefit that is likely to be sought for secular reasons; whether
the timing of the request renders it suspect (e.g., it follows an
earlier request by the employee for the same benefit for secular
reasons); and whether the employer otherwise has reason to
believe the accommodation is not sought for religious reasons.
However, none of these factors is dispositive.195

The ability to demand a show of sincerity reduces, but does not
eliminate, the concerns about abuse.196
4. Valent v. Board of Review

As previously discussed, a New Jersey Court of Appeal recently
ruled that a hospital offering religious exemptions from influenza
immunization cannot deny them to those with secular objections to
vaccination.197
June Valent began working for Hackettstown Community
Hospital, New Jersey, in 2009. In 2010 the hospital adopted a policy
requiring workers to be vaccinated against influenza and offered
medical or religious exemptions. Employees who qualified for an
exemption were required to wear a mask.198
Ms. Valent refused the vaccine, even though she had no medical
reason, and vaccinating would have reduced her chances of
contracting influenza and transmitting it to vulnerable patients. She
was not, however, willing to pretend her reasons for refusing the
vaccine were religious. She clearly stated that her reasons were
secular. She did agree to wear a facemask, as any vaccine exempt
worker would.
The hospital fired Ms. Valent for violating the policy. The issue
under consideration was whether she was entitled to unemployment
benefits. Under New Jersey law, an employer may deny
unemployment benefits if the employee engaged in misconduct, which

195. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 185, at 13.
196. Reiss, supra note 97, at 1559-90.
197. Valent v. Bd. of Review, Dept. of Labor, 91 A.3d 644, 648 (N.J. Super.
App. Div. 2014).
198. Id. at 645.
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includes violating a reasonable rule of the employer.199 After somewhat
complex proceedings, the Appeal Tribunal of the Board of Review of
the Department Of Labor decided to deny her the benefits because
the employer’s requirements were “not unreasonable.”200
The New Jersey Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the
benefits. The court ruled that firing Ms. Valent “unconstitutionally
violated [her] freedom of expression by endorsing the employer’s
religion-based exemption to its flu vaccination policy.” 201 The policy
“discriminates against an employee’s right to refuse to be vaccinated
based only on purely secular reasons.”202 It also determined that
because the employer offered a non-medical exemption, the policy was
clearly not driven only by health concerns.203
This decision is problematic in several ways. The result is
probably correct: first, the requirement that those with religious
objections “have a letter from a spiritual leader” discriminates against
those whose religious opposition does not stem from organized
religion, and therefore is likely unconstitutional. We are not as
comfortable commenting on the employment law issues, but denial of
seven weeks of unemployment—when the employee has already lost
her job—seems severe. Refusing the vaccine does not seem to be the
kind of deliberate misconduct that would justify such a sanction.
Although, the counter argument is that a health care worker who
violates the employer’s rules by refusing a simple, safe precaution like
a vaccine is showing a high level of disregard for the safety of
patients. We would still lean away from denying unemployment
benefits; on top of firing, it seems petty.
That said, the decision is extremely problematic in its analysis
and implication, and should not stand. Let’s start with the legal
problems, and then address the policy issues. The court found the
main issue to be that denying Ms. Valent benefits “unconstitutionally
violated [her] freedom of expression by endorsing the employer’s
religion-based exemption to its flu vaccination policy”204 and the
hospital’s policy “discriminates against an employee’s right to refuse
to be vaccinated based only on purely secular reasons.”205 Neither part
can stand. First, basing this on freedom of expression rather than the
199. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(b) (West 2010); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 12:1710.6 (2003).
200. Valent, 91 A.3d at 646 (internal quotation marks omitted).
201. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
202. Id. at 648.
203. Id. at 646-647.
204. Id. at 644.
205. Id. at 648.
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Free Exercise Clause (of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution) is strange. Vaccinating is an act, not an expression. So
is taking an exemption. The best argument we can suggest in support
of this ruling is that to qualify for an exemption, Ms. Valent had to
express a reason. Making the exemption religious restricted her
freedom of speech by only allowing her to make certain explanations.
But that’s a strange way to use freedom of speech, and not the way it
is usually applied. An explanation of why one fits the requirements of
a waiver is not the same as expressing an opinion. This looks like an
issue of freedom of conscience, not of expression.
Similarly, our laws very clearly distinguish between religious
beliefs and other beliefs. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits discrimination against religion, not against every opinion,
and requires accommodation of religious beliefs, not every whim. The
Constitution, too, treats religion differently. It’s true that the
definition of religious beliefs, as already discussed, is broad;206 but it’s
not limitless. It does not extend to political beliefs, and it does not
extend to safety concerns about vaccines. Distinguishing between
religious and non-religious reasons is not discrimination: it’s treating
differently two different types of reasons that are already subject to
different treatment in our legal system.
Legally speaking, the decision is very problematic. It is also
problematic policy-wise. Broadly applied, it would abolish the
distinction between religious beliefs and philosophical exemptions,
allowing anyone in a state that offers a religious exemption to opt
out, even if the state requires show of sincerity, even if the applicant’s
sole reason is safety concerns. Our jurisprudence surrounding
exemptions was never applied that way—and states offering only a
religious exemption seem to seek to apply it to a certain set of reasons
only.
Further, in Valent, the court found that the religious exemption
undermined the declared goal of the policy, which is to protect
patients’ health, because the employees with such exemptions will still
be putting patients at risk.207 By offering a religious exemption, the
court said, the hospital admitted that it was not focusing solely on
health considerations.208 The court concluded that if the hospital is
willing to put the values some employees hold above patients’ health,
the hospital should not discriminate among such values.209
That, too, is problematic. First, a hospital’s willingness to
206. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970); see also notes
182-183 and accompanying text.
207. Valent, 91 A.3d at 647-48.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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accommodate those with religious opposition does not imply
insincerity in its health concerns or that it’s willing to put them aside.
It can easily suggest that a hospital thinks religious concerns are very
important and that it should make an attempt to accommodate, as
much as possible, both health concerns (by a mandatory policy) and
religious concerns (via an exemption). A hospital can also legitimately
anticipate, since most religions do not oppose vaccines,210 that the
number of religious exemptions will be small, and the harm to health
less with the policy and exemption than without the policy.
Forced to extend the exemption to those with secular objections,
too, a hospital will likely find the health goals undermined. Valent is
wrong on the law and problematic on policy grounds.
5. State RFRAs

After Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA),211 attempting to reinstate the strict scrutiny
of statutes that interfere with religious observances. The Court struck
down RFRA’s application to the states,212 though it still applies to the
federal government.213 Subsequently, several states passed their own
RFRAs.214
Generally, RFRAs revert back to applying strict scrutiny to
examine statutes that interfere with religious freedom. This means
those statutes must use the least restrictive means to achieve a
compelling government interest—a high burden. Note that in states
where the requirement derives from a RFRA, a new statute can
deviate from the RFRA—subject to cannons of statutory
interpretation (for example, the deviation has to be explicit). In states
where applying strict scrutiny to freedom of religion claims is based
on an interpretation of the state’s Constitution, a new statute cannot
deviate from the RFRA.
How would this affect vaccine mandates? They should not affect a

210. Reiss, supra note 97, at 1569.
211. 42 U.S.C. §§2000bb–1(a), (b).
212. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). Congress reenacted a
more limited, subject specific statute protecting religious freedoms in
certain contexts—Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
of 2000 (RLUIPA), 114 Stat. 803, 42 U. S. C. §2000cc et seq.—but in
this context, RFRA still does not apply to the states. See Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2761-62.
213. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2761.
214. See Eugene Volokh, What Is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act?,
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Dec.
2,
2013 7:43
AM),
http://www.volokh.com/2013/12/02/1a-religious-freedom-restorationact/ (providing a map of states with RFRA statutes).
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private employer’s freedom to impose workplace requirements. They
may affect state statutes, and they may be seen as requiring public
employers to offer a religious exemption, but not necessarily. As
explained above, there is at least a strong argument that mandatory
vaccination programs serve a compelling interest—the lives and
health of vulnerable patients. If there is no good alternative, then
they can be seen as the least restrictive means. However, this is a
higher bar, and it may mean that reassignment, even if burdensome,
will be required.

IV. Discussion: What is Desirable in Vaccine Policy?
Personal autonomy is important. Our system particularly values a
person’s freedom to refuse medical treatment.215 Our system, under
Schloendorf and even Jacobson, would almost certainly disallow
forcible vaccinating of an adult in sound mind. But personal
autonomy is not limitless. For example, an individual can be
quarantined if they have an infectious disease and are a risk to
others.216 As Jacobson highlighted, refusing to comply with reasonable
public policy can lead to criminal sanctions.217 Our discussion here
involves a lower level of coercion. It would be untrue to say that a
risk of losing your job does not limit a person’s options, and hence the
threat of termination can exert influence or even feel like coercion.
But an individual’s choice to work in a given field generally comes
with the understanding that the individual will have to comply with
some rules and regulations in the work place, and those may change
over time. This is even truer for an individual that chooses to enter a
profession as heavily regulated as the health care field. An individual
making the choice to work in health care should be aware that they
are entering a profession subject to rules addressing ethics as well as
health and safety. It is also a service profession, no less than the legal
field, and an individual should expect to be subject to limits and rules
to protect the patients that put their trust in the professional. An
individual is not giving up their complete freedoms, of course, but
implicit in the autonomous choice of profession is agreement to
reasonable health and safety regulation—including regulation for the
health and safety of the patient. Refusing a precaution as simple and
safe as a vaccine against influenza is refusing a reasonable regulation.
215. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (“Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body”).
216. City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265, 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. L. Div.
1993).
217. Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
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It would not justify tying an employee down and force-vaccinating
them, but it does suggest the employer is justified in taking lesser
steps, up to and including dismissing the employee. The employee’s
rights and interests are not the only ones at stake: patients have
rights and interests as well, including the right not to be put at higher
risk of a dangerous disease.
When we are talking about a private employer, it’s important to
remember there is a third set of rights involved: the rights of the
private employer to run their operation according to the standards
they support. It’s not clear why an employee’s right not to protect
themselves and others against a dangerous disease should trump an
employer’s freedom to act to increase the health and safety of patients
and to have a safer and healthier facility.
Mandatory immunization policies protect vulnerable patients
against infection, prevent absenteeism of workers, and therefore serve
important interests.218 They are desirable.219 We agree with Cox and
Stewart that the most cost-effective way to impose mandatory
immunization policies is via state statutes. Going through the
democratic process can provide the policy with legitimacy, and the
legislature has, under our Constitution, substantial leeway to balance
the public health with other considerations.220 But to be effective,
statutes need to address implementation—to condition continuing
work on receiving the vaccine.
If a legislature is unable or unwilling to pass a mandate, there is
no reason for a private employer not to do so, and there are many
good reasons to offer it. However, in a unionized workforce, employers
may face challenges in applying such a policy without bargaining with
the union.
We believe both statutes and employer policies should offer
medical
exemptions
to
those
who
have
acknowledged
contraindications, under the assumption that those exemptions would
be limited enough to not create a severe risk and that people should
not be penalized because they have the misfortune of being allergic to
a vaccine. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the counter argument, the
need to protect patients.
We would argue against offering a religious exemption. The
constitutional limitations on religious exemptions make preventing
their abuse extremely hard—and they are not required under the
First Amendment or under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for
employers. The one exception is when a state RFRA is interpreted to
require one.
218. Randall et al., supra note 78, at 1772.
219. See Caplan, supra note 26, at 311.
220. See Stewart & Cox, supra note 5, at 830.
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V. Conclusion
When a person chooses to go into health care, that person makes
an autonomous choice to work in a service profession, serving the
interests of vulnerable patients. With such choices come certain
obligations. Among those is the obligation to take basic precautions to
protect vulnerable patients against infections. It is uncontroversial
that requiring hand washing is perfectly appropriate. It should be
uncontroversial that requiring the simple, safe precaution of an
influenza vaccine is also appropriate. The vaccine would protect both
the worker and the patients. If a health care worker is not willing to
take it, he or she is failing in his or her duty to the patients.
Furthermore, if a health care worker is unwilling to trust a
medical intervention as well supported by research as vaccines, how
can he or she trust the rest of the medical science they ostensibly
provide?

402

